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The Early Indicators of Modernisation in the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia Presented by Prof. Dr. Erol Mutlu
Mutlu: Hello from Turkey. Today, our guests are Mrs. Prof. Dr.İsenbike Togan, faculty member at the Middle East Technical University, Department of History, and Dr. Aksin Somel, faculty member at Bilkent University. We are going to talk about the legacy of the past when we are entering into a new millennium. Our topic will be related with the process of modernisation both in our country and in the region that was called Türkistan previously. The type of modernisation, which we want to dwell upon, is not only related with the introduction of the use of modern instruments in everyday life, but the modernisation in the mentality of people. Let’s start with the Ottoman modernisation, if you like. After having discussed the ways of development of the Ottoman modernisation in its roots, we will turn to the topic of modernisation of the Mohammedan Turkistan. Now, I want to invite Mr. Somel to evaluate the Ottoman modernisation. The word is yours, Sir. Somel: To be able to understand the Ottoman modernisation one has to look, first, at the cultural peculiarities of the Ottoman Empire. During its classical period, that is, between 14th and 16th centuries, Ottoman Empire was an institution full of self-confidence that saw itself as the centre of the world order, evaluated itself as superior to the other Islamic civilisations. Mutlu: Isn’t that a general trait that can be seen in all similar empires? Somel: The same peculiarity can be observed both in the Holy Roman-German Empire and the Chinese Empire. As Mrs. İsenbike knows better, the Chinese Empire, too, saw itself as the centre of the world. Togan: China means mid-land. Somel: If we accept the Ottomans as the champions of the Islam, we see that they, as am empire based on the holy war, undertaking the mission of spreading the word of Islam all over the world. Especially after the 1683 Vienna defeat, this situation has changed drastically. At the end of the wars that it waged against the Holy Alliance between 1683-1699, the Ottoman Empire realised that it was weaker than the non-Islamic countries that it competed. This realisation caused a very serious change in the mentality of the Ottoman elite. At the end of the 1699 Karlovcha Treaty, the Ottoman Empire had lost the feeling of seeing itself as the most superior civilisation. And as a result of this loss, it began to turn its gaze towards the West. At first this turn of gaze towards the West was limited to the field of technology. Maybe it is true that there were some borrowing from the West during the time of the Mehmed the Conqueror and other Ottoman Sultans. But, after 1699 these efforts of imitation had had a different meaning. During this later period, the Ottoman elite and especially the bureaucratic class would have established the Ottoman modernisation into a much more serious framework. In this sense, we can accept the period between from 1699 to 1789, that is, until the coronation of Selim III, as a period of confusion. During this period, and especially during the times of Ahmet III and Mustafa III, we see some attempts towards the foundation of schools. In the examples like engineer school that was founded by the help of Baron de Bonebal and Mühendishane-i Bahri Hümayun [Palace School of Marine Engineering] that was founded in 1773/74, we see the first attempts towards modernisation. But, until 1789 these attempts at modernisation were rather partial and not planned attempts around a well-defined programme. But, after the coronation of Selim III in 1789 this situation has changed, and a new programme for modernisation called Nizam-i Cedit has been commenced. That was more comprehensive, more institutionalised and directed towards the totality of the Empire lands. Now, why there was such a transformation during the time of Selim III? With the Little Kaynarca Treaty following the 1768-74 Ottoman-Russian War, the Ottoman Empire has realised that it was impossible to protect the integrity of its land depending only on its own resources. After 1774, the Ottoman Empire was in practice, no longer a big European state. It was for this reason that the Ottoman would have to depend on the balance of European diplomacy for their own existence. Mutlu: I guess there was some attempts towards modernisation among the Mohammedan people of Turkmenistan at about 1700s. What do you think on this? Togan: 18th century was an important turning point there, too. But it was not a turning point in the sense of modernisation, as we understand the term today. But rather, it was a turning point from the angle of changes that took place in political structures. In 1730s the Kazakhs began to fall under the Russian rule, on the one hand. Edil-Ural region fell under the Russian rule already in the 16th century. But during the 18th century, after Nadir Shah Avshar’s expedition onto Central Asia, it is possible to observe a political disintegration in the region. Especially in the region that includes Uzbekistan and a part of Türkistan this political disintegration was significant. By this way, there was an important transformation of the political legitimacy. It is possible to see this as modernisation. Because, before this transformation it was only possible for the people of the Genghizid family to rule in the region. But after Nadir Shah Avshar, it was possible for the other begs (notables) to be rulers. Among these people there are those who was able to take on the title of ‘Khan’ like the emir of Bukhara as well as people who could never get such a title. All these seem to be preparations for the changes that will take place during the 20th century. When we look at the Turkish history as a whole we see the Ashinas among Kokturks. The Karahanids, too, thought that they were descending from the Ashinas, that is, from Aphrasiap. This period, the period during which the rulers were getting their authority from God ends in 1200s, and when Genghiz Khan establishes his own rule in 1200s, it becomes impossible even for the offspring of Genghiz Khan’s brothers to rule any longer. After that period only Genghiz Khan’s children and grandchildren could become rulers. The best example for this is Temur himself. He never took the title Khan over himself, but remained as ‘Emir Temur’. Who was going to be the Khan was determined with very clear rules. This also applies to the Amuas. For example, in the 15th century, Isen takes the title ‘Khan’ over himself even though he was not entitled to do this, and in the end he gets killed for this reason. When we come to the 18th century we see nobody who gets killed for this reason. The begs could get the title ‘Khan’. For example, the Kongriat khans in Khiva did not come from Genghis’ family. On the contrary, they were descending from the Kongriat tribe from whom Genghiz had taken his bride. I guess, in the middle of such changes in the political structure they were not much interested in the transformations taken place in the outside world. Mutlu: But, they had negative relationships with Russia, for the most part? Togan: For my thinking, during the course of the 18th century it was impossible to talk about negative relationships with Russia. Because, the Western Mongols that we call Kalmuks were in the process of empire building in Central Asia between 1600s and the beginning of the 18th century. Indeed, they were controlling the trade between Russia and China at that period. According to a source, once the Russian ambassador asks a Kalmuk how far China is away and Kalmuk says that one has to travel three years to be able to get there. Better for you to give your goods to us to deliver them to China. In 1698 Russia and China met each other at Amur River. They sign the Nelchinsky Treaty, and by this treaty the Kalmuk intermediacy was no longer needed. In 1734 they signed the Kahta Treaty. This was a treaty concluding the direct trade between Russia and China. After this, some border-trade cities were established, and in 1759 the Emperor of Chihennum eliminated Kalmuks. Because, they were taken Tibet and Eastern Turkistan at the same time. In addition, that the Kazakhs accepted the Russian rule was related with the fact that they had lost much of their power in their struggle against the Kalmuks. For this reason, it is impossible to say that the relations with Russia were on the negative on the greater part. The important thing is the great transformations in the 18th century. When we look at the politics, we see no modernisation in our sense. Modernisation in education begins at the second part of the 19th century. Mutlu: I guess, until that time the Ottomans were still continuing to announce themselves as the leaders, champions of Islam. Somel: I guess, there is an increase in this tendency compared to the previous time. The more the physical power of the Empire declines, the more the Ottomans began to emphasise the importance of the institution of the Khalifate in their efforts to increase the symbolic or moral power of the state. Mutlu: Well, what was the nature of the relationships between the region called Türkistan and the Ottoman centre, capital? Somel: I have to admit that I don’t know much about the nature of the relations in the 18th century. But, during the 19th century the Ottoman cultural modernisation.... Mutlu: I guess, during the period that you said you didn’t know they were so absorbed into their own internal affairs that they were not engaged in conducting relationships with the outside world. Somel: Perhaps it is possible to talk about such relationships in a definite sense: in the 18th century, Nadir Shah in Iran was the common enemy of both the Ottomans and Bukharians. For this reason they conducted joint expeditions. But, with the emergence of the Ottoman cultural modernisation and Turkish nationalism, we see an increasing cultural interest in the Ottoman Turkey directed towards the Turks in Central Asia. For example, Ahmet Vefik Pasha translated Ebul Ghazi Bahadur Khan’s Shecere-i Turki into Turkey Turkish. Togan: In a new history book written in the 19th century, we observe a similar attitude as we have today towards the Uyghurs, towards the ancient history of Asia. In our contemporary education system, the knowledge relating to the history of Central Asia after the second half of the 19th century was learned from the West. Texts written in the West were not known to Osman Ghazi. But in the 19th century the books written by the French authors during 1850s were translated by the Ottomans. Another aspect of this increasing interest was the desire to find their roots in that part of the world. Somel: The Turkish element in the Ottoman Empire as a multi-national empire was limited to a part of the governing elite. But, since the official language of the Empire was the Ottoman Turkish, at least on the lingual basis it is possible to talk about an ethnic consciousness. I guess both in the period of their formation and later periods the Ottomans have never lost the consciousness of their Central Asian roots. We see this in Asik Pashazadeh and other chroniclers. This is more of a sign representing the consciousness of identity rather than a direct interest in Central Asia. Togan: I think this link is established within an Islamic context. In the 19th century there began talks of pro-Islamic Turks. Mutlu: Were there such shift of interest in the Palace, too? Somel: Yes. Such a consciousness was always present. We don’t know much about the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia in the 18th and 19th centuries. But we know well that the Ottoman Empire had close relationships with the Crimean Khanate. Thinking that the Crimean Khanate happened to be within the context of the Islamic societies in Russia, we can say that the only direct connection the Ottomans had with Central Asia was via the Crimean Khanate. The Crimean Khanate was something similar to a small partner of the Ottoman Empire. Even though it was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, it was still a monarchy with its own independent diplomacy and army. The connection between Russia and the Muscovite Tsardom was also maintained by the Crimean Khanate until the Karlovcha Treaty. The Muscovite Tsardom was paying tribute to the Crimean Khanate until the Istanbul Treaty in 1700. This important position assumed by the Crimean Khanate would continue later on. Togan: Dimitri Kantimir who was in the Ottoman lands for a while in the 17th century stated in a footnote to his book stated that the name Kantimir was related with Temur. He was tracing his genealogy back to Emir Temur. He stated that some members of his family had accepted Islam and he was descended from the line that was converted to Christianity in Besarabia. He tells in his book about the conditions prevailing in Asia at this time. He even tells us about the Kalmuks and they were not mentioned in any of the contemporary history books. Dimitri Kantimir gives us many valuable information about the state of affairs beyond the Caspean See. Mutlu: Had Central Asia developed a special attitude towards the Ottomans then? Togan: Shaybani Khan in Uzbekistan had Ahmedi’s ‘Iskendernameh’ among his possessions. Ahmedi completed his book that he wrote between 1390-1405 while he was travelling among the begliks of Aydinoglu, Germiyanoglu and Osmanoglu. His book was the first book on the Ottoman history that also covered Genghiz Khan, the Anatolian begliks. As we see in Ali Shir Nevai and Ahmedi, it is possible to deduce the existence of such relationships from the works of literature, too. Of course, the sects (tarikas) also played an important role in the establishment and maintenance of such relationships. There were Uzbek tekkes (lodges) in Istanbul. We find a book in Bursa that was written on Emir Kulal. There is an anecdote told in this book: A young man enters into the court of Emir Kulal and sits without any greetings. Then, again without any greetings he exists. Others curiously inquire the reason of his doing such. He says, ‘I’m coming from the lands of Rum. Emir Kulal is well known in my country. He knows better why I have come. We are inclined to see religious narrations as literature but we should realise that it is also a part of the social life. This book was written about 1450s. This shows that Emir Kulal was a very famous personage at that time. According to what I have learned later from Prof. Bahtiyar Babacanov of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, he even began to turn into a cliche. Migrations also helped to maintain the relationships between the religious sects. People knew the places of these various tekkes. There was also no discontinuity in the commercial relations. I think someone wrote an article on the Turkistanian lodges (tekkes) in Tarsus. Somel: In the 14-15th centuries the Turkish civilisation in Central Asia was much more developed in comparison to the Ottoman civilisation. They had astronomers like Ulug Bek and Ali Kushchu at that time. When the first Ottoman medresah, the Manastir Medresah, was founded, the Ottoman ulema took lessons in mathematics in Samarkhand. Until the end of the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror, the Ottoman ulema were intellectually connected to Central Asia. As for the courtly literature, we see that in the 15th century the Chaghatay language was much more refined and well established than the Ottoman literary language. The establishment of the courtly literature among the Ottomans was a rather late phenomenon. For this reason, the Chaghataids were seeing the Ottoman Empire as a buffer zone where the holy war was waged. It was only later that the Ottomans were able to prove themselves as the founders of a civilisation. Togan: I think, it was in the 19th century that this process has reversed. Then, everybody was willing to go to Istanbul to get an education there. It became nearly a tradition that the pilgrims on their way to Mekkah would visit Istanbul and buy books. Mutlu: Let’s turn to the topic of the interaction between Turkistan and the Ottomans related with the process of modernisation in the 18th century. Somel: We can look at the Ottoman modernisation as a reflex developed by the Empire for its self-protection. For this reason, it is not easy to separate the Ottoman modernisation from the Ottoman bureaucratic organisation. The dragging force behind the Ottoman modernisation was the Ottoman bureaucracy or Kalemiye (scribes). International relations gained a prominence because after 1699 the Ottoman Empire was no longer able to prove itself. Mutlu: The Ottoman Empire had a past dominated with power shows. It is possible that with such a past full of glory, now the Empire had to move towards an enforced modernisation, had to borrow and learn from the lands on which once it was the victorious conqueror can cause a feeling of inferiority? Somel: I don’t know it the term ‘feeling of inferiority’ fits here. But it was clear that the Ottoman Empire had lost its self-confidence to such a degree that even when the armies of the Peter the Great were surrounded by forces of Baltaci Mehmed Pasha in the War of Prut in 1711/12, the Ottomans were not able to make use of this advantage. This was a traumatic process. Perhaps we are also carrying some traces of it. What was important for the Ottomans was to complete the process of modernisation while keeping their own identity. But this was a difficult task. On the one had there were some necessities, some institutions had to be improved, new schools should be open. And on the other hand, there was the prevailing religious frame of mind that insistently resisted to such transformations. But the Ottoman Empire had also an older advantage. Even though it was an Islamic Empire, its Islamic character was never dominant in the organisation of the Empire. In other words, there was an separate space created and maintained by the statecraft and state procedures. The Islamic ulema were always in the state’s service in the Ottoman Empire. The sultan had the right of legislation. Of course the laws should have been in agreement with the Sharia, but nevertheless the laws were not derived from Islamic rules. In this sense there was a non-Islamic ruling tradition that found its roots in the history. This tradition was a very important ground in the modernisation process of the 18th and 19th centuries. This also played a significant role in the modern Turkish secularisation. In short, the interests of the state in the name of the Islamic community were also in accord with the religion. Mutlu: When did the interaction between the Ottoman modernisation and the Turkish-Islamic modernisation begin and how it did develop? Togan: When we look at the whole Central Asia including Edil-Ural, Turkistan where the contemporary republics are located and Bashkortostan and Tataristan, we see three types of reformation movements even if they are not through modernisation movements. In the region of Edil-Ural Khursavi in the 18th century, Mercani in the 19th and Musa Cenova in the 20th centuries were all open-minded men of the Islamic ulema. They were trying to eliminate some conservative elements in the society that remained from the past. There are some who explain the phenomenon that such members of ulema were more enlightened by the fact that they lived in a region closer to Russia. Such persons generally inclined to think that all the novel tendencies always come from the West. Of course, there has to be some interaction inbetween. But, there were also some elements originating from their own civilisation. The separation of the religion and the state that we mentioned a while ago could be seen in the Golden Horde region, too. When we look at the works produced previously in that region, what strikes us is a sort of continuity. This means that it is possible to understand the reformatory movements that emerged in the 18th century with the help of various rules. On the other hand, the movements that emerged in the regions occupied by the contemporary Uzbekistan and partially by Kirghizistan were directly against the Islamic ulema. Among the Kazakhs, the relationships with the Russian administration that began in the 18th century introduced them with the Russian education system in the 19th century. Of the descendants of Genghiz Khan, Choan Genghisovich and Nihalov got their education in Russian schools. Those persons we mentioned wanted to understand their own people even when they were attending the colonial schools. For this purpose they collected folk epics when they were going to East Turkistan. There were no pro- or anti-mollah movements among the Kazakhs. Because there was no such a problem there. This shows that it is impossible to look at the Islamic society in Russia in just one way. You said that the Ottoman modernisation had originated from the Ottomans’ own efforts to protect themselves. On the other parts, however, modernisation emerged in the form of autonomy movements. There was interaction with Turkey on the basis of book exchange. For example, Zeki Velidi Togan in his “Memoirs” mentions Arif Bey’s book entitled “Things That Fell upon Us”. This book talks about the sadness of Arif Bey in the face of the defeat after the Balkan War. In the second half of the 19th century Ismail Bey establishes a school organised in accord with the ideas of the new ‘usul-u cedid’ [reformatory style] in Crimea which was close both to Central Asia, the Ottomans and other places as well, and this leads us to name all such movements as Cedidist [reformist]. We differentiate the movement that took place at that time into two as Kadimist [New Comers] and Cedidist [Reformist]. These movements whose roots are different comes to be convergent and start interaction with each other both before and after the October Revolution. They were travelling to Istanbul oft. Ziya Gokalp, too, was a source of inspiration. Mutlu: Had the educational modernisation any relation with the increasing frequency of the interconnection? Somel: Separation of education in the Ottomans is another process. Especially the Islamic Turkish intelligentsia who came from the Russian Tsardom in the second half of the 19th century were able to benefit the modernisation of education in the Ottomans. We see people like Mizan-ul Firat as personages who contributed to the cultural and intellectual development of the Ottomans. We see the beginning of the Ottoman educational system with the foundation of Rustiye schools starting from 1847. Of course the roots of the educational modernisation go back to the foundation of the military schools in the 18th century. But, the civil schools, rustiyes, equivalent to modern secondary schools, were began to be founded from 1840 onwards. Mutlu: Did these rustiyes represent a model devised by the Ottoman bureaucracy? Somel: These rustiyes were an advanced form of the higher-level theory schools called Selahattin-i Ihzam that existed until 1830s. They represent an advanced form of these schools with the addition of some courses such as mathematics, Turkish grammar, geography and ethics. The inclusion of the history courses into the curriculum of such schools from which persons attained their maturity would graduate took place at a rather late date in 1870. Togan: Approximately at about the same time the Usul-u Cedit schools, too, began to offer history and geography courses. There were even discussions at that time whether history teaching was a sin or not. Mutlu: Why did such arguments emerge regarding the sinfulness of history teaching? Togan: In the Usul-u Cedit schools there were courses in mathematics, geography, history and Arab grammar offered in addition to the previously taught theology. This dualism created a problem in approaching history. It brought about the rise of some questions regarding who was going to write our history. Somel: The history course is a very crucial matter. Because, the history course is a means for the legitimation of a political system. For example, the history books in the Ottoman Empire were dynasty-centric until the declaration of the Second Constitution. The only exception to this rule was Selim Sabit Efendi’s textbook entitled “Muhtasar Tarihi Osmani” as an attempt for a theoretical history that was taught between 1870 and 1908. Togan: Was only the Ottoman history included there? Somel: In Rustiye schools, yes. But, later on, when the Idadi [Preparatory] schools were founded, courses like Tarih-i Umumi [General History] and Tarih-i Islam [Islamic History] were taught. While the textbooks written during the reign of Abdulhamid II narrated the ancient Mesopotamian and Indian civilisations, in 1902 we come across the first mentioning of the Central Asian civilisations. Togan: In 1912, Zeki Velidi Togan wrote the Turkish-Tatar history for the first time. In the words of Edward Allworth, with this attempt it became possible for the first time to look at the history of the Turks in its totality. The history book that Togan wrote in 1912 saw history in its totality starting from the Khuns. This book, having no connections what so ever with the central authority, was accepted by the intelligentsia of the times. Mutlu: Our program ends here. I thank you both for your participation. Have a nice day you all. pc12.soc.metu.edu.tr (5 December 1999, Ankara) |