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KING CONRAD III OF GERMANY AND THE FAILURE OF THE SIEGE OF DAMASCUS 1148

Jonathan PHILLIPS*

This paper has two purposes: First, to consider why, in the summer of 1148, the Second Crusade chose to attack Damascus, rather than campaign at Edessa as it originally intended. It will suggest that the influence of relations between King Conrad III of Germany and Emperor Manuel Comnenus have been mistakenly passed over in previous discussions of this topic. Secondly, the paper will discuss the possible reasons for the failure of the siege of Damascus.

The Second Crusade had been called in response to the capture of Edessa by Zengi, the Muslim ruler of Aleppo and Mosul, in December 1144. A year later, Pope Eugenius III issued the crusading bull Quantum praedecessores and in the spring of 1146, inspired by this document and the preaching of Bernard of Clairvaux, King Louis VII and the nobility of France flocked to take the cross and to recover Edessa. By the end of 1146 King Conrad III of Germany had also vowed to join the crusade and preparations for the expedition absorbed the Latin West. In the summer of 1147 the two royal armies set out for the Levant with Conrad’s force marching ahead. His troops behaved poorly as they passed through the Byzantine Empire and there was considerable tension between the Germans and the Greeks. The latter were greatly worried by the presence of the crusaders and suspected that they might attack Constantinople; an ongoing raid on the Peloponnese peninsula by a Sicilian fleet exacerbated the situation because the Byzantines feared that they might combine forces.¹

In November 1147, as the German army tried to hurry across Asia Minor, via Iconium, they were heavily defeated by the Seljuk Turks in the waterless plateau to the north-west of the city². The survivors of the army met up with the next wave of crusaders led by King Louis VII of France but by late December 1147 the ill-health of King Conrad and the shattered morale of his men caused the Germans to part company with the French and a number of them chose to return to Constantinople to recuperate.

King Conrad spent the early months of 1148 in the Byzantine capital regaining his strength. At one point he seemed near death but a few weeks at the imperial court, sometimes cared for by the emperor himself, refreshed the king before he resumed his holy endeavours³. Manuel’s kind treatment of Conrad was a dramatic contrast to the frosty relationship between the men a few months previously, but with the crusade no longer a threat to Constantinople and the desire to secure the German ruler’s support for a counter-attack on the Sicilians the situation was quite different. It is likely that the two monarchs agreed in principle at least, to an alliance against Roger of Sicily, while good terms were cemented further by the marriage of the emperor’s niece, Theodora, to Conrad’s brother, Henry of Austria⁴. In late February 1148 the king wrote to the regent of Germany, Abbot Wibald of Stavelot, to praise the emperor’s kindness towards him and to say that he intended to leave for Jerusalem on 7 March, to gather a new army there over Easter and then proceed to Edessa (et Rohas processuri) as originally planned⁵. John Kinnamos and William of Tyre stated that Manuel presented Conrad with money, fine gifts and a fleet of triremes to transport him to the Holy Land⁶. The Annales Herbipolenses added that the emperor provided 2000 finely equipped horses⁷.

Conrad reached Acre in early April (Easter fell on 11 April); where he celebrated Easter before he journeyed on to Jerusalem in the company of many of his senior nobles and churchmen; in spite of his defeat in Asia Minor the king still had a strong core of well-armed knights in his retinue. From the perspective of the Latin settlers, the arrival of the most powerful monarch in the Latin West was a cause for great celebration. Conrad was received with huge delight and King Baldwin III, Patriarch Fulcher of Jerusalem and the entire populace greeted him outside the city and, to the sound of chants and hymns, escorted him inside⁸.

Of particular interest at this stage is a comment - ignored by most modern historians - but made by a contemporary eye-witness. Otto of Freising, half-brother of King Conrad, a former Cistercian monk and a leading intellectual of the day, was also the man who had led the non-combatant element of the German crusaders to defeat in eastern Asia Minor. Otto wrote that around this time - May 1148 - Conrad made an agreement with Baldwin, Fulcher and the Templars to lead an army against Damascus in July. Clearly this pre-dated the crusaders’ major strategic council at Palmarea in late June (the event that historians have tended to focus on) but it must have influenced, if not almost entirely pre-empted, that discussion. Conrad’s inclination towards an attack on Damascus was a radical change from his February statement that he wished to go to Edessa.

A prime reason for this may have been a fuller understanding of the huge damage inflicted upon the fabric of Edessa and the slaughter of the majority of the Christian inhabitants in the Muslims’ brutal repression of Count Joscelin II’s bid to recapture the city in October 1146. In other words, Edessa was no longer worth recovering. One might also speculate that Conrad’s stay in Constantinople had exerted an effect too. Otto of Freising wrote that once he reached the Levant the king spent substantial sums of money to retain knights in his service and to gather ‘what troops he could by a lavish expenditure’⁹. By reason that a significant proportion of this funding was given to Conrad by Manuel before he left Constantinople, the king may have felt uneasy in spending it on an expedition in the north; why?

The answer is that it would probably benefit Prince Raymond of Antioch, a man with whom the Greeks had experienced a turbulent relationship over the previous decade. Raymond had tenaciously resisted Byzantine attempts to impose authority over him in 1137-38 and 1142-43. Only a third invasion of his lands in 1144 brought him to heel and compelled him to travel to Constantinople in person, humble himself before the emperor and submit to imperial overlordship. Yet, as William of Tyre related, from the time that the Second Crusade was launched in Europe, the prince had entertained serious hopes that it would bolster his position in northern Syria. He planned to recapture Aleppo and Shaizar - the very places specified in the 1137 truce as being the cities that the Greeks would exchange for possession of Antioch itself if they were taken by a Byzantine force at some point in the future¹⁰. Thus, if Raymond, in conjunction with the Second Crusade, could seize them in his own right his authority in the region would be dramatically enhanced and the Greeks’ hopes of securing Antioch would be void. It is highly likely that Conrad was made aware of these possibilities during his stay in Constantinople. As he prepared to leave Manuel, boosted by his newfound Greek ‘sponsorship’, as well as existing marriage ties and a shared enmity of King Roger, Conrad was perhaps inclined - or maybe he was persuaded or strongly advised - to ignore Edessa and fight in the Holy Land instead. Thus, in turn, Manuel saw a strategic benefit from his generosity to the German king.

With regard to the position of the settlers in Jerusalem, the collapse of their recent treaty with Unur of Damascus and his growing rapprochement with Nur ad-Din, sealed by the marriage of the Damascene’s daughter to the ruler of Aleppo, had changed the strategic dynamic of the Levant¹¹.

While Conrad gathered his forces in the kingdom of Jerusalem, to the north trouble had erupted between Louis VII and Raymond of Antioch. As noted above, the prince had felt certain that the king, as his fellow-Frenchman and husband of his niece, Queen Eleanor, would wish to fight in northern Syria. Yet at a council held in May 1148 the French monarch had rejected such a plan, saying that he wished to visit the holy places instead¹². Louis too, may have been discouraged by the news of the poor situation of Edessa. Furthermore, many in his army blamed the terrible losses they suffered in Asia Minor on the treachery of the Greeks. With Antioch as a vassal of Byzantium there was no wish to increase (indirectly) the dominions of the people whom they regarded as their betrayers. Once Louis declined to campaign in the north the matter became further clouded by allegations concerning a possible relationship between the queen and Raymond as the prince reportedly vowed to take revenge on the king by seducing his wife. True or not, these rumours had wide, and rapid, currency.

The news of the rift between Louis and Prince Raymond quickly reached Jerusalem. The nobility saw a golden opportunity before them; earlier they had genuinely expected the king to fight at Edessa. While the recovery of that city or, more seriously, the capture of Aleppo would benefit all the Christians in the East, the seizure of either Damascus or Ascalon would be of greater immediate advantage to Jerusalem. By 1148, the situation in the Levant had changed since the fall of Edessa four years previously. When the crusade was first launched, relations between Jerusalem and Damascus had been good. Since then, the atmosphere had become hostile, plus Edessa no longer seemed worth recovering. It was, therefore, now far more feasible for the crusade to fight in the south. The fact that Conrad’s own agenda also inclined him towards a campaign against Damascus, rather than Aleppo or Edessa, was a neat coincidence of interests and led to the agreement noted by Otto of Freising above.

Patriarch Fulcher was sent north to capitalise on the rift between Louis and Raymond and he duly convinced the king to come down to Jerusalem. If Fulcher had also carried the news of Conrad’s arrangement concerning an attack on Damascus, the French king might have been even more inclined to join forces in the south; in some senses, given his argument with Raymond, and Conrad’s promise, he had little choice. When he finally reached the holy city in early June Louis was greeted with great honour and delight and, to the accompaniment of hymns, he and his fellow French crusaders were escorted in¹³.

With the two main crusading armies together in the Levant for the first time a discussion on their next move was needed. A general assembly was called to the town of Palmarea, near Acre around the feast of St John the Baptist, 24 June 1148¹⁴. This was a splendid event - it was a gathering of the most important individuals yet to assemble in the history of the Latin East. The presence of the two senior crowned heads of the West, plus many close members of their families, along with senior churchmen and nobles, was unprecedented; the sense of anticipation for both settlers and crusaders must have been enormous.

The assembly had to consider where to attack although given the agreement noted above it was almost redundant; perhaps the presence of Louis at Palmarea meant that some airing of the key principles was worthwhile. William described a debate in which various options were discussed, although sadly, he did not elaborate. He then stated that by unanimous agreement it would be best to besiege Damascus. The call was put out to muster the entire military strength of the kingdom, ‘cavalry, infantry and natives’. The settlers’ forces joined with the armies of Conrad and Louis and marched through Tiberias, along the Sea of Galilee to Banyas, on the north-eastern edge of the kingdom of Jerusalem. From there they crossed Mount Lebanon and descended towards Damascus, preparing to attack it from the west¹⁵.

The orchards that encircled the city provided a fine defensive barrier. Each plot was surrounded by a dry mud wall to demarcate ownership and some had towers to allow the proprietor to see over his land and to defend it. The only way through these densely planted trees was by narrow pathways, wide enough to permit the pack-animals and small carts that transported fruit back to market but in no way conducive to the passage of a large army. Yet the Franks had made a conscious choice to approach from this direction, a decision explained by; first, the belief that if they succeeded in breaking through the city’s strongest defences, then morale in Damascus would collapse; secondly, that the fruit trees and irrigation channels provided supplies of food and water essential for the siege¹⁶.

On 24 July King Baldwin’s troops started to work their way through the orchards. The crusaders incurred some casualties, but as the day wore on they made good headway, pushing down the barricades and capturing the towers and their defenders. The Muslims began to despair and fled back out of the orchards across a plain and the river in front of the city itself.

The Damascenes realised the orchards were lost and that the city walls would soon be under attack. They deployed mounted archers and small mobile ballistae to try to stem the crusaders’ advance before the river. For obvious reasons, the Christians needed to reach the water and, after pausing to regroup, King Baldwin’s men began to close with the enemy. It seems that they made little progress until the arrival of Conrad’s troops. The king heard of the loss of momentum and he gathered his knights and charged towards the fray. According to William of Tyre, the German knights leapt down from their horses, as was their custom in a desperate situation, and engaged the enemy with swords and shields. The impact of this new onslaught drove the Damascenes back and the river was won¹⁷.

By this time the Christians were in an excellent position; they held the suburbs, they were able to camp on the plain in front of the city walls and could obtain food and water from the orchards and the river. The Damascenes barricaded the streets with tall beams to try to block the Christian advance, but there appeared little chance of holding out. With victory seemingly in their grasp, however, the crusader armies then made a highly controversial decision, one that provoked much discussion at the time and has attracted considerable attention from modern historians¹⁸. Perplexingly, they chose to abandon their strong, well-supplied position to move to the opposite (south-eastern) side of the city where it was argued they could achieve a quick victory. No orchards, river or moat were there - only a low, weak wall that could easily be forced. William of Tyre painstakingly explained that the Damascenes promised large sums of money to certain nobles of Jerusalem to convince the Christians to lift the siege from the west and move to other side of the city where it would be doomed to failure. Conrad and Louis relied on the advice of the local nobility and consented to the plan, leaving their hard-won gains for the dry side of Damascus. Once in the new location, they quickly began to run out of food but could not return to their original camp because the locals had barred the roads with beams, rocks and squadrons of archers. The defences to the south-east were not as feeble as had been claimed and, faced with the prospect of starvation - something that the Germans and French had already each endured once on the expedition - the Christians reluctantly, and with great ill-feeling, began to leave. It is worth emphasising that the crusaders had not even been defeated in battle; arguably, their retreat was a far greater humiliation than losing some epic military encounter.

At the time of the crusade, William of Tyre was a student in western Europe and he wrote his account of the campaign over 25 years after it took place¹⁹. He was aware of the importance of the event, however, and in his own words, ‘interviewed wise men and those whose memory of those times is still fresh... I endeavoured to learn the reason for this great wrong; who were the instigators of such treachery; and how so detestable a crime could have been carried through. I found that the reports vary greatly in regard to this matter’²⁰. In other words, he made exhaustive efforts to uncover the truth but came up with no definitive answer; William was clear, however, that treachery on the part of someone was to blame. The moral weakness of certain Christians, tempted by avarice, was at the root of the defeat. This analysis excluded the unpalatable possibility that the Muslims may have been too strong for the Christians and caused their retreat. Given the crusaders’ huge confidence in their divinely sanctioned cause the human failings of the settlers in the Levant was a relatively tolerable interpretation of the calamity.

William wrote that some blamed the greed of Count Thierry of Flanders who had allegedly asked the two western kings to be given Damascus when it fell²¹. Others of William’s sources indicated that the simmering ill-feeling of Prince Raymond of Antioch encouraged nobles in the army of Jerusalem to ensure Louis’s crusade failed, although this seems both impractical and unlikely²².

There is a contemporary voice, however: Conrad III was certain who was responsible and he wrote to Wibald: ‘With general consensus we reached Damascus and set up our camp in front of the city gate. Although our men faced considerable danger, there can be no doubt at all that the city was close to being captured, and surrendering. But then, those who we had no reason to distrust, behaved in this way: they claimed that the side of the city we were on was impregnable and intentionally led us to another district where there was neither water for the army, nor was it possible to gain entry. Everyone was angered by this and turned around and retreated in grief with the siege a failure’²³. Betrayal by the local nobility had the benefit of removing any stigma for the defeat from the royal personage. Given that the leadership of Jerusalem had been so keen to encourage Conrad towards an assault on Damascus when he first arrived in the kingdom, their behaviour must have seemed even more frustrating.

Eastern Christian writers, including Michael the Syrian and the ‘Anonymous Syriac Chronicle’, both mentioned the offer of substantial bribes to the king and local nobility. The latter source also put forward a variation on the story concerning the settlers’ fear of westerners taking control of Damascus, although this time Conrad was identified as the source of suspicion²⁴, By way of a parallel it is worth observing that the siege of Shaizar in 1138 had ended with the Christian attackers accepting payments from the defenders as a Muslim relief force approached²⁵.

While these various sources advance the explanation of treachery, as Forey notes, ‘if the city was about to fall [on the west], Conrad and Louis would hardly have accepted any arguments for a change in the point of attack’²⁶. Therefore, it is necessary to consider why the need to move, or to consider moving, arose. The evidence of another contemporary eye-witness, the local Muslim writer, Ibn al-Qalanisi, is crucial here. He wrote that the Franks made considerable progress on the first day of the siege and took the orchards and suburbs and killed two important holy men. All the people ‘were discouraged and straitened in spirit through fear because of the horror of what they had witnessed’²⁷. But Ibn al-Qalanisi adds important information to the Latin accounts of the siege when he mentions that the following day the Damascenes launched sorties against the Christians and there was fierce fighting. Both sides charged against one another from dawn to dusk and Unur took a leading role in the defence of his city. By way of inspiration the inhabitants had gathered in the Great Ummayad Mosque and the revered Koran of Caliph ‘Uthman (644-56) was displayed to the people who sprinkled their heads with ashes and prayed for divine aid²⁸.

Ibn al-Qalanisi also suggested that Damascene appeals for help began to secure a response with the arrival of a steady stream of reinforcements - particularly bowmen - from the Beqa Valley. The next day saw further fierce fighting with neither side giving ground. By this point, however, the Muslims seemed to have gained the upper hand with parts of the crusader camp surrounded and some of their barricade defences falling. At the same time the Christians heard of the advance of further Muslim relief forces, all eager to engage in the jihad; for this reason the attackers’ nerve failed and, with no prospect of victory, they broke camp and set out for their own lands. Ibn al-Qalanisi wrote that his people pursued the crusaders and killed large numbers of their men and many of their fine war-horses²⁹. While there may be a sense of exaggeration and natural pride in the achievements of the Muslims (the losses on the retreat, for example, are not mentioned by any Christian source), the kernel of the account can be accepted.

Thus, on account of their slow progress to the west of the city, coupled with the imminent arrival of Muslim reinforcements, the Christians’ need to gamble on a quick victory can be understood. This interpretation can be nuanced further if we add a statement from John of Salisbury who met some crusaders on their homeward journey through the papal court in the summer of 1149. He wrote that the best authorities believed Damascus would fall if an attack from the western side persisted for 15 days³⁰. The local Franks evidently relied on the river and the orchards for supplies because they had brought little in the way of foodstuffs with them. We should also consider what the western sources omit: To invest a major city, one would expect to need siege machinery, yet no accounts mention the Christians bringing or using such equipment. Either they did not get close enough to the walls to employ it or they believed that a victory in battle would cause the city to capitulate. There is little sense that Damascus had particularly formidable walls; instead the Muslims relied on the orchards and the suburbs as defences. Evidence from Ibn al-Athir, who wrote in northern Syria in the early thirteenth century, adds more important information; he indicated that Unur had appealed to Saif-ad-Din of Mosul, who joined Nur ad-Din at Homs, and was poised to march south when the Christians gave up. Unur threatened to hand over Damascus to the Zengids if the crusaders did not retreat. He wrote to the nobles of Jerusalem and claimed that if he surrendered the city to Saif ad-Din then the Christian lands would not survive. He offered Banyas as a bribe and this convinced the local Franks to persuade the crusaders that they should retreat³¹. Because the distance from Damascus to Mosul is over 400 miles Forey has suggested that the time between the crusaders’ decision to target Damascus at Acre on 24 June and the siege one month later might not have been long enough to get organised and bring a relief force³². Yet the presence of the crusaders in the Holy Land was widely known and Saif ad-Din would have surely moved westwards as a precaution in case they attacked his brother in Aleppo. The sense of Ibn al-Athir’s writing is that an appeal was made well before the siege began; furthermore, the Franks’ understanding that it would take 15 days for Damascus to fall from the west gave a bigger window of time for the Zengids to arrive. There is a tension between William of Tyre’s claim that the crusaders had been persuaded by the settlers that ‘Damascus would be easily taken at the first attack’, and the 15 day period recognised as necessary to complete the siege³³. In the case of the former, Muslim reinforcements would be irrelevant, but with regard to the latter, the approach of Saif ad-Din meant a quick success was vital. After four days of engagement, news that the Zengids would arrive within the 11 days remaining needed to succeed to the west could have spurred the Christians change their plans. On account of the stiffer than expected Muslim resistance, the nobles of Jerusalem may well have suggested the move to the south-east. While Ibn al-Qalanisi failed to mention the crusaders shifting their camp, not all of the Christian writers included this as well. John of Salisbury recorded a reconnaissance mission made by the bishop of Langres while the crusaders discussed their options and prepared to move, but the decision to retreat had already been taken. Godfrey’s survey may have confirmed the lack of water and this, combined with the Muslim advance, meant that a retreat was prudent. In fact, John suggested that Conrad wanted to go back to Jerusalem and prepare more thoroughly - perhaps a reference to the need for siege materials or more supplies - and then return³⁴.

In the event, the Christians did not make another attack on Damascus, although as Conrad informs us (and William of Tyre also records), they discussed the prospect of a campaign against Ascalon at a gathering with Baldwin III and Louis; this never took place either and gravely disappointed, Conrad prepared to set sail for home on 8 September 1148³⁵.

To summarise: the hitherto ignored evidence of Otto of Freising indicates that it was the actions of Manuel Comnenus in supporting - and probably advising - Conrad III that did much to direct the Second Crusade towards Damascus. Once there, it seems likely that the primary explanation for the Christian withdrawal lay in the approach of Muslim troops from the north, rather than the treachery of the native nobles. In any case, to the horror of the crusaders, their great expedition collapsed to leave relations between the Latin East and the West in a parlous condition and a Muslim world greatly heartened and ready to continue the jihad³⁶.

* Prof.Dr., Royal Holloway, University of London.

(Prof. Dr. Işın Demirkent Anısına, Dünya yayınları, Şubat 2008)
 

1 For a more detailed discussion of these events see: J.P.Phillips, The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christianity (London, 2007).

2 J.Roche, ‘Conrad III and the Second Crusade: Retreat from Dorylaion?’, Crusades 5 (2006), pp. 85-94.

3 ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G.H.Pertz et al.,32 vols (Hannover, Weimar, Stuttgart and Cologne, 1826-1934) 16.7.

4 P. Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143-1180 (Cambridge, 1993), p. 52, n. 93.

5 Conrad III, Die Urkunden Konrads III., und seines Sohnes Heinrich, ed. F.Hausmann, MGH, DD 9 (Vienna, 1969), no. 195, pp. 354-55.

6 John Kinnamos, The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus, tr. C.M.Brand (New York, 1976), p. 71; William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. R.B.C.Huygens, 2 vols. Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis 63, 63A, [continuous pagination] (Turnhout, 1986) p. 755.

7 ‘Annales Herbipolenses’, p. 7.

8 Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici seu rectius Chronica, eds. G.Waitz, B.Simson and F-J.Schmale, tr., A.Schmidt (Darmstadt, 1965), pp. 262-65; William of  Tyre, pp. 755-56.

9 Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici, pp. 264-65.

10 J.P.Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West, 1119-1187 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 68-74, 92-94.

11 M.Hoch, Jerusalem, Damaskus und der Zweite Kreuzzug: Konstitutionelle Krise und äußere Sicherheit des Kreuzfahrerkönigreiches Jerusalem, A.D. 1126-54 (Frankfurt, 1993), pp. 90-113.

12 William of Tyre, p. 755.

13 William of Tyre, pp. 756-57.

14 D.Pringle, The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem. A Corpus, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1993-2007), 2.153-56.

15 William of Tyre, pp. 760-62.

16 Ibid., pp. 763-64.

17 William of Tyre, pp. 764-65.

18 B. Kugler, Studien, zur Geschichte des zweiten Kreuzzugs (Stuttgart, 1866), pp. 194-201; V.G.Berry, ‘The Second Crusade’, in: A History of the Crusades, ed. K.M.Setton, 6 vols. (Wisconsin, 1969-89), 1.507-11; S.Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1951-54) 2.281-85; J.P.Niederkorn, ‘Traditio, a quibus minime cavimus. Ermittlungen gegen König Balduin III. von Jerusalem, den Patriarchen Fulcher und den Templerorden wegen Verrats bei der Belagerung von Damaskus (1148)’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 95 (1987), pp. 53-68.

25 William of Tyre, pp. 675-76; Ibn al-Qalanisi, The Damascus Chronicles of the Crusades, ed. and tr. H.A.R.Gibb (London, 1932), pp. 248-52.

26 A.J.Forey, ‘The Failure of the Siege of Damascus in 1148’, Journal of Medieval History 10 (1984), p. 20.

27 Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 284.

28 Sibt al-Jauzi, ‘Mirror of the Times’, tr. in F.Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades (London, 1969), p. 62.

29 Ibn al-Qalanisi, pp. 284-86.

30 John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, ed. and tr. M.Chibnall (London, 1956), p. 57.

31 Ibn al-Athir, ‘Extrait du Kamel Altevarykh’, Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens orientaux, 5 vols.,(Paris, 1872-1906), 1. 468-70.

32 Forey, ‘Failure of the Siege of Damascus’, pp. 17-18.

33 William of Tyre, p. 767.

34 John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, pp. 57-58.

35 Conrad III, Urkunden, no. 197, p. 357; William of Tyre, p. 769.

36 The author would like to thank Dr Ebru Altan for her patience in the production of this paper. He would also like to recognise the generous support and encouragement provided to him by Professor Demirkent during visits to Istanbul.